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TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES: WHY A 
BROADER READING OF GRAHAM AND 
MILLER SHOULD PROHIBIT DE FACTO 
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES FOR 
JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
DANIEL JONES† 
INTRODUCTION 
Jeffrey Ragland was seventeen years old when he made a 
terrible mistake that would leave him facing a lifetime of 
imprisonment.1  One night in 1986, he and a group of friends 
were in a grocery store parking lot in Council Bluffs, Iowa.2  He 
and two friends attacked another group of boys, and by all 
accounts, Ragland was the instigator.3  During the incident, one 
of Ragland’s friends, Matt Gill, proceeded to swing a tire iron 
striking Timothy Sieff in the head and instantly killing him.4  
Ragland was tried as an adult and was mandatorily sentenced to 
life without parole, while Matt Gill served just three years in 
prison.5  When Ragland was forty-four years old, the Governor of 
Iowa commuted his sentence to sixty years with no possibility of 
parole or credit for time served,6 based on a recent United States 
Supreme Court decision.7  Thus, although not directly 
responsible for the tragic death of Timothy Sieff, Ragland would  
 
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., cum laude, 2016, St. 
John’s University School of Law. 
1 State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Iowa 2013). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 111–12. 
6 Id. at 110–12. 
7 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (holding that defendants 
who committed homicide crimes as juveniles could not be sentenced to life without 
parole before considering certain mitigating factors). 
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not be eligible for parole until he was seventy-eight years old, 
while Matt Gill, who actually swung the tire iron, had been free 
for nearly twenty-four years.8 
In the last decade, the Supreme Court has decided three 
cases that have drastically altered the way juveniles are 
sentenced in this country.  In 2005, the Court issued the 
landmark decision of Roper v. Simmons,9 which held that the 
death penalty for juvenile offenders is per se unconstitutional as 
a violation of the Eighth Amendment.10  Five years later, the 
Court again spoke on juvenile sentencing in Graham v. Florida.11  
The Court adopted a categorical rule for nonhomicide juvenile 
offenders, holding that a sentence of life without parole is 
unconstitutional.12  Finally, in 2012, the Court concluded its 
“trilogy”13 on juvenile sentencing with Miller v. Alabama.14  In 
Miller, the Court held that juveniles who committed homicide 
offenses could not be mandatorily sentenced to life without parole 
without individualized assessments as to the juvenile’s character 
and background.15 
Recently, a split has emerged amongst state and federal 
courts16 regarding a significant issue that was not expressly 
addressed in any of the Court’s holdings in the trilogy of juvenile 
sentencing cases mentioned above.  Say, for example, a juvenile 
is sentenced for a nonhomicide offense to ninety years in jail 
without the possibility of parole until seventy years are served.  
This would not be a death penalty case so Roper is not triggered, 
nor does the sentence of life without parole render Graham 
inapplicable.  Finally, the offense is nonhomicide, thus rendering 
it outside of Miller’s application.  But effectively, such a sentence 
amounts to the equivalent of life without parole. 
 
8 Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 112. 
9 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
10 Id. at 568. 
11 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
12 Id. at 82. 
13 See, e.g., State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 50 (Iowa 2013) (referring to Roper, 
Graham, and Miller as the “trilogy”); Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old 
Enough To Do the Crime, Too Young To Do the Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107, 
107 (2013) (referring to Roper, Graham, and Miller as the “trilogy”). 
14 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
15 Id. at 2469. 
16 See infra notes 130–158 and accompanying text. 
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Commentators and courts refer to the sentencing described 
above as “de facto” life sentences because they are the functional 
equivalent of life without parole.17  Federal and state courts have 
dealt with the issue of de facto life sentences in different and 
conflicting ways.18  Some courts have used the “spirit” approach, 
which acknowledges that while the Court has not dealt directly 
with the de facto life sentence issue, the spirit of the trilogy cases 
bars courts from sentencing juveniles to lengthy term-of-years 
sentences.19  The opposite approach is the “letter of the law” 
approach, which applies the trilogy very technically and allows 
lengthy term-of-years sentences for juvenile offenders.20  For the 
time being, it appears that the Supreme Court will continue to 
allow state courts to apply their decisions in Roper, Graham, and 
Miller in vastly different ways.21 
This Note argues that the spirit of the trilogy prohibits 
courts from sentencing juvenile offenders, regardless of their 
crime(s), to de facto life sentences.  This Note maintains that the 
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the 
relevant case law render de facto life sentences unconstitutional.  
Part I examines the history of juvenile sentencing laws and 
concludes that many of the laws currently in place are based on a 
misguided fear that juveniles are more culpable than adult 
offenders.  Part I also examines the relevant Supreme Court 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as well as the competing 
17 See, e.g., Adams v. State, No. 1D11–3225, 2012 WL 3193932, at *2 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2012) (“[A] de facto life sentence is one that exceeds the defendant’s 
life expectancy.”); Cara H. Drinan, Commentary, Misconstruing Graham & Miller, 
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 785, 791 (2014) (“By far, the greatest judicial debate in the state 
courts has been around the issue of ‘de facto life sentences.’ ”). 
18 See infra Part II. 
19 This approach is best described by the Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. 
Ragland: “The spirit of the constitutional mandates of Miller and Graham instruct 
that much more is at stake in the sentencing of juveniles than merely making sure 
that parole is possible” and that “Miller applies to sentences that are the functional 
equivalent of life without parole.” 836 N.W.2d 107, 121–22 (Iowa 2013). 
20 This approach seems to get its inspiration from Justice Alito’s dissenting 
opinion in Graham v. Florida, where he stated, “Nothing in the Court’s opinion 
affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of 
parole.” 560 U.S. 48, 124 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). The basic rationale of this 
approach is that because the Supreme Court did not specifically address lengthy 
term-of-years sentences, states are permitted to sentence juveniles to de facto life 
sentences. See infra Part II.A. 
21 See Drinan, supra note 17, at 791–92; see generally Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (holding that the Miller rule should be applied retroactively to 
juvenile offenders but leaving alone the de facto life sentencing issue). 
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theoretical arguments used by courts.  Part II presents the split 
in federal and state courts interpretations of Roper, Graham, and 
Miller, and examines the conflicting approaches used by courts in 
deciding whether de facto life sentences of juvenile offenders are 
permissible.  Part III asserts that de facto life sentences are 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment and the Supreme 
Court trilogy.  Part III also concludes that in the absence of 
legislative compliance, state courts have a duty to apply the 
trilogy to de facto life sentences.  Finally, Part IV sums up why 
courts and legislatures should ignore the letter of the law 
argument on de facto life sentences. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Part first explores the history of juvenile sentencing 
laws in the United States.  Next, this Part discusses the Supreme 
Court trilogy and analyzes what the purpose of those decisions 
really were.  Finally, this Part discusses differing judicial 
theoretical frameworks, specifically formalism and realism, and 
minimalism and maximalism, with the goal of showing how these 
theories have led to differing approaches amongst the federal and 
state courts dealing with de facto life sentences for juvenile 
offenders. 
A. History of Juvenile Sentencing Laws 
In 1899, the world’s first juvenile court opened in Cook 
County, Illinois,22 and by 1917, nearly every state adopted some 
form of a separate juvenile court system.23  Juvenile courts used 
“informal methods” and rejected criminal procedures afforded to 
adults.24  The policy behind these early juvenile courts was that 
“[j]udges acted in offenders’ ‘best interests’ and imposed 
indeterminate and non-proportional dispositions to enhance [the 
juveniles’] future well-being rather than punish them for past 
offenses.”25 
 
22 Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility 
and LWOP Sentences, 10 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 16 & n.25 (2007). 
23 Michelle Marquis, Note, Graham v. Florida: A Game-Changing Victory for 
Both Juveniles and Juvenile-Rights Advocates, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 255, 261 (2011). 
24 See Feld, supra note 22, at 17. 
25 Id. 
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This system remained largely intact until the 1960s when “it 
became apparent that the purpose of juvenile court proceedings 
was no longer primarily to protect the best interest of the child 
and was instead becoming more punitive in nature.”26  The 
United States Supreme Court decided two cases in the 1960s that 
required courts sentencing juveniles to use many of the same 
procedural safeguards afforded to adults.27  Although meant to 
protect juveniles, these decisions “may have stimulated a 
mindset of increased exposure of youth to adult criminal 
sentences.”28 
In the 1980s and the early 1990s, with the crime rate rising 
across America, there was a growing fear of juvenile “super-
predators.”29  The theory of super-predators was based on a 
perceived increase of juvenile violent crime in the 1980s and 
1990s.30  A typical characterization of the super-predator fear can 
be found in Princeton University Professor John Dilulio Jr’s 1995 
article titled “The Coming of the Super-Predator”: 
On the horizon, therefore, are tens of thousands of severely 
morally impoverished juvenile super-predators.  They are 
perfectly capable of committing the most heinous acts of 
physical violence for the most trivial reasons (for example, a 
perception of slight disrespect or the accident of being in their 
path).  They fear neither the stigma of arrest nor the pain of 
imprisonment.  They live by the meanest code of the meanest 
streets, a code that reinforces rather than restrains their 
26 State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 52 (Iowa 2013). 
27 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1967) (holding that many procedural 
protections given to adults must be given to juveniles as well); Kent v. United 
States, 383 U.S. 541, 563–64 (1966) (holding that procedural safeguards are required 
in juvenile waiver proceedings). 
28 Null, 836 N.W.2d at 52–53; see also Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to 
Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99, 101 (2010) (arguing that Kent 
and In re Gault “actually helped create the political environment responsible for the 
punitive criminal justice policies of the 1970s and beyond”). 
29 See Feld, supra note 22, at 28–32 (discussing the crack epidemic and the rise 
of violent juvenile arrests); see also Marquis, supra note 23, at 262–64. The term 
super-predator came from an influential book published by political scientists 
William J. Bennett, John J. DiIulio Jr., and John P. Waters titled “Body Count: 
Moral Poverty . . . and How to Win America’s War Against Crime and Drugs.” See 
Feld, supra note 22, 31 n.108. 
30 See Marquis, supra note 23, at 262–63 (arguing that in the 1980s and 1990s 
“there was a perceived increase in violent juvenile crime”); see also Juvenile Arrest 
Rates by Offense, Sex, and Race (1980-2014), OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/dat.html (last visited Apr. 
5, 2016). 
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violent, hair-trigger mentality.  In prison or out, the things that 
super-predators get by their criminal behavior—sex, drugs, 
money—are their own immediate rewards.  Nothing else 
matters to them.  So for as long as their youthful energies hold 
out, they will do what comes “naturally”: murder, rape, rob, 
assault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get high.31 
Largely in response to this fear, state legislatures across the 
country passed “adult crime, adult time” statutes that included 
provisions making it easier to transfer juveniles to adult courts.32  
As a result of these “adult time, adult crime” laws, nearly 
200,000 youths are prosecuted as adults every year.33  This 
represents an eighty percent increase from the previous 
generation.34 
The fear of juvenile super-predators espoused by Professor 
Dilulio and others appears to be misguided.35  In fact, according 
to a 2013 study, youth violent crime is at a thirty-two-year low.36  
Although some states have modified their “adult crime, adult 
time” statutes,37 the rationale and fear of super-predators still 
seeps forward when juveniles are sentenced to de facto life 
sentences.38  However, the Supreme Court trilogy cases decided 
31 John J. Dilulio Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, THE WEEKLY 
STANDARD (Nov. 27, 1995), http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-coming-of-the-super-
predators/article/8160. 
32 See, e.g., Feld, supra note 22, at 31 (“In the mid-1990s, virtually all states 
changed their laws to make it easier to transfer more and younger youths to 
criminal court for prosecution as adults.”); David L. Hudson Jr., Adult Time for 
Adult Crimes: Is Life Without Parole Unconstitutional for Juveniles?, ABA J., Nov. 
2009, at 16 (“On the heels of fear about rising juvenile crime and reports of juvenile 
‘super predators,’ legislatures across the country enacted ‘adult crime, adult time’ 
statutes, including automatic waiver laws that provide for the transfer of more 
youths from juvenile court into adult criminal court.”). 
33 See Arya, supra note 28, at 108. 
34 Martin Guggenheim, Ratify the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
But Don’t Expect Any Miracles, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 43, 53 (2006). 
35 See Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-
bus-recalls-superpredator-threat-of-90s.html. 
36 Jeffrey A. Butts, Violent Youth Crime in U.S. Falls to New 32-Year Low, JOHN 
JAY C. CRIM. JUST. RES. & EVALUATION CTR. (Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://johnjayresearch.org/rec/files/2013/10/databit201304.pdf. 
37 Stephanie Chen, States Rethink ‘Adult Time for Adult Crime,’ CNN (Jan. 15, 
2010, 7:37 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/01/15/connecticut.juvenile.ages. 
38 For example, the trial court in Graham indicated some acceptance of the 
super-predator fear when sentencing the juvenile defendant to life without parole. 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 57 (2010) (“[T]his is an escalating pattern of 
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in the last decade have reignited the discussion on juvenile 
sentencing laws throughout the country.  In these cases, the 
Court attempted to peel back some of the harshness associated 
with juvenile sentencing that arose from the super-predator fear. 
B. The Supreme Court Trilogy: Roper, Graham, and Miller 
From 2005 to 2012, the Supreme Court issued three opinions 
on juvenile sentencing that drastically changed how juveniles are 
sentenced in this country.  Specifically, the Court seemed to 
indicate that, in terms of sentencing, “kids are different” and 
could not be constitutionally sentenced to the harshest 
penalties.39  This section will explore each of the three cases and 
show how the trilogy collectively stands for the broader 
proposition that there are “inherent differences between adults 
and juveniles” and, as such, state courts must “give juvenile 
offenders hope to reenter society” regardless of whether the 
sentence is life or a de facto life sentence. 40 
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of 
Roper v. Simmons and held that the death penalty was per se 
unconstitutional for juvenile offenders.41  Roper involved a 
heinous murder committed by Christopher Simmons when he 
was seventeen years old.42  The State of Missouri charged 
Simmons with burglary, kidnapping, stealing, and murder in the 
first degree.43  Based on Missouri law, Simmons was tried as an 
adult.44  The jury quickly convicted Simmons of murder and  
 
criminal conduct on your part and that we can’t help you any further. We can’t do 
anything to deter you. This is the way you are going to lead your life.”). 
39 See Stephen St. Vincent, Commentary, Kids Are Different, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 9, 9, 12 (2010). 
40 Leslie Patrice Wallace, “And I Don't Know Why It Is That You Threw Your 
Life Away”: Abolishing Life Without Parole, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida 
Now Requires States To Give Juveniles Hope for a Second Chance, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. 
L.J. 35, 39 (2010). 
41 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
42 Id. at 556. Simmons and an accomplice broke into the victim’s house at 2:00 
a.m., used duct tape to cover her eyes and mouth, and drove her to a railroad over 
the Meramec River. Id. at 556–57. Once at the railroad, they tied her hands and feet 
with electrical wire, covered her face in duct tape, and threw her from the bridge, 
causing her to drown. Id. After the murder, Simmons showed little remorse and 
bragged about the murder to friends. Id. at 557. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. Missouri law placed seventeen-year-olds outside of the juvenile court 
system. Id. 
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recommended the death penalty; Simmons appealed the trial 
court’s decision and the case was eventually granted certiorari by 
the Supreme Court.45 
The Court began by addressing the diminished culpability of 
juvenile offenders.46  It explained that there are three important 
differences between juveniles and adults that ultimately caution 
against ever imposing the death penalty on a juvenile offender.47  
First, juveniles exhibit “[a] lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . . These qualities often 
result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”48  
Second, compared to adults, “juveniles are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, 
including peer pressure.”49  Finally, the Court noted that “the 
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”50  
According to the Court, these differences “render suspect any 
conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders”51 and 
were thus less deserving of the death penalty than their adult 
counterparts.52  The Court then held that juveniles below the age 
of 18 are per se barred from being eligible for the death penalty, 
regardless of the crime committed.53 
The main question left unanswered by Roper was whether 
the case was “simply a death penalty case, which rested on the 
slogan ‘death is different,’ or did Roper have wider implications 
for cruel and unusual punishment cases involving juveniles?”54  
Five years later, the Court in Graham held that it was 
unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile nonhomicide offender to 
life without parole without giving the offender “some meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity 
and rehabilitation.”55 
45 Id. at 557–60. 
46 Id. at 568. 
47 Id. at 569–70. 
48 Id. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 
(1993)). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 570. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 571. 
53 Id. at 575. 
54 State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 62 (Iowa 2013). 
55 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). 
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Graham involved several crimes committed by defendant 
Terrance Graham.56  In 2003, when Graham was sixteen years 
old, he and three accomplices attempted to rob a restaurant in 
Florida.57  Graham was prosecuted as an adult, pled guilty, and 
received three years of probation.58  Six months after his release, 
Graham was again arrested for armed burglary and attempted 
armed robbery.59  Under Florida law, Graham was subject to a 
minimum sentence of five years and a maximum sentence of life 
without parole.60  The trial court sentenced Graham to the 
maximum sentence on each charge, the result of which was a life 
without parole sentence.61  The trial court reasoned that Graham 
was given a second chance on his previous sentence and that 
Graham decided to “[throw his] life away.”62 
In deciding Graham, the Court began by noting that there 
are generally two classifications with respect to the 
proportionality of a sentence.63  One classification involves a case-
specific inquiry to determine if the sentence in question is 
“excessive”64 while the other classification involves categorical 
rules for death penalty sentences.65  The Court decided that the 
second category was the relevant classification here, as it 
involved a “categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence.”66  
This was a pivotal move by the Court, indicating that it would 
issue a Roper-type categorical rule regarding life without parole 
sentences.67 
56 Id. at 53–55. 
57 Id. at 53. 
58 Id. at 53–54. 
59 Id. at 54–55, 57. Graham and two accomplices forcibly entered the home of 
Carlos Rodriguez and held him at gunpoint. Id. at 54. The same evening, the three 
attempted a second robbery during which one of the accomplices was shot. Id. 
60 Id. at 55–56. 
61 Id. at 57. Graham was also sentenced to fifteen years for the attempted 
armed robbery charge. Id. 
62 Id. at 56. 
63 Id. at 59. 
64 Id. In this category, the Court is looking at the specific case and is not looking 
at a broad category, such as juveniles and the death penalty. Id. 
65 Id. at 60–61. In this category, the Court is issuing broad categorical rules that 
apply to an entire class of offenders. Id. at 60. An example of this approach is Roper, 
where the Court decided that for all juveniles the death penalty was 
unconstitutional. Id. at 61. 
66 Id. at 61. 
67 See id. at 102 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Until today, the Court has based its 
categorical proportionality rulings on the notion that the Constitution gives special 
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The Court then turned to the question of culpability and 
noted that “Roper established that because juveniles have 
lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe 
punishments.”68  It then stated that “defendants who do not kill, 
intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically 
less deserving of the most serious forms of punishments than are 
murderers.”69 
The Court next addressed the life without parole sentence 
itself, and concluded that it was “the second most severe penalty 
permitted by law.”70  In another key move, the Court noted the 
similarities between a life without parole sentence and the death 
penalty.71  The Court stated that like the death penalty, a life 
without parole sentence is “irrevocable,” and that it “means 
denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character 
improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future 
might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will 
remain in prison for the rest of his days.”72  The Court then noted 
how life without parole was unusually harsh for a juvenile 
offender because a juvenile will serve more years and a longer 
proportion of their lives in jail than their adult counterparts.73 
Finally, the Court held: 
A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a 
juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime.  What the 
State must do, however, is give defendants like Graham some 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.  It is for the State, in 
the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for 
compliance.  It bears emphasis, however, that while the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a life without 
parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, it does not 
require the State to release that offender during his natural life.  
protection to capital defendants because the death penalty is a uniquely severe 
punishment . . . .”). 
68 Id. at 68 (majority opinion). 
69 Id. at 69. 
70 Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
71 Id. at 69–70. 
72 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 
(Nev. 1989)). 
73 Id. at 70. The Court gave an example of a sixteen-year-old and a seventy-five-
year-old being sentenced to life without parole sentences, and noted that they were 
the “same punishment in name only.” Id. 
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Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn 
out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for 
the duration of their lives.  The Eighth Amendment does not 
foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide 
crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for 
life.  It does prohibit States from making the judgment at the 
outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.74 
What was abundantly clear after Graham was that a State 
cannot make a “once-and-for-all determination of [a juvenile] 
offender’s capacity to change” at the outset by sentencing them to 
life without the possibility of parole.75  The Court made it clear 
that juveniles sentenced to life without parole for nonhomicide 
offenses are not guaranteed release but instead must be given “at 
least a shot at redemption.”76  The Court was very careful to limit 
its holding to life without parole sentences for nonhomicide 
offenses only and was careful to point out that the States 
themselves would have to determine the “means and 
mechanisms for compliance.”77 
Justice Alito wrote a short but influential two paragraph 
dissenting opinion.78  He noted that “[n]othing in the Court’s 
opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years 
without the possibility of parole.”79  This one-sentence statement 
would come to have a vast impact on the de facto life sentence 
issue. 
Many things were unclear after Graham.  Some 
commentators argued that Graham indicated a shift from the 
proposition that “death is different” to “kids are different.”80  If 
“kids are different,” the issue left unaddressed in Graham deals 
with what other crimes or sentencing schemes the reasoning may 
be applied to.81  The other issue left unaddressed deals with what 
74 Id. at 75. 
75 Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Commentary, Redemption Song: Graham v. 
Florida and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 86, 94 (2010). 
76 Id. at 93. 
77 Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. 
78 Id. at 124 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito’s reasoning was picked up by 
many states that narrowly apply the trilogy and allow de facto life sentences. See 
infra notes 138 and 149 and accompanying text. 
79 Graham, 560 U.S. at 124 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
80 See St. Vincent, supra note 39, at 9. 
81 State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 67 (Iowa 2013) (stating that “the notion that 
Graham’s reasoning was limited to nonhomicide cases was proven wrong in Miller”). 
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the States must do to comply with the Court’s requirement of 
giving a juvenile nonhomicide offender “some meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity 
and rehabilitation.”82  Some unresolved questions were answered 
just two years after Graham, when the Court concluded its 
trilogy in Miller v. Alabama and held that “the Eighth 
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in 
prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders,” 
regardless of the crime committed.83 
Miller involved two separate cases that were consolidated 
into one appeal to the Supreme Court.84  In 1999, when Kuntrell 
Jackson was fourteen years old, he and two other boys were 
involved in a video store robbery.85  During the robbery Jackson 
stayed outside of the store but later entered.86  When the store 
owner threatened to call the police, she was shot and killed by 
one of the accomplices.87  A jury convicted Jackson of capital 
felony murder and aggravated robbery, and under Arkansas law, 
the judge was required to sentence Jackson to life without 
parole.88 
The other case involved Evan Miller, who, like Jackson, was 
fourteen years old at the time he committed his crime.89  In 2003, 
Miller and a neighbor went to Cole Cannon’s trailer where the 
three smoked marijuana and drank alcohol.90  When Cannon 
passed out, Miller and his friend stole his wallet, took $300, and 
attempted to put the wallet back in Cannon’s pocket.91  Cannon 
awoke and grabbed Miller by the throat; subsequently, Miller’s 
friend grabbed a baseball bat, gave it to Miller, and then Miller 
repeatedly struck Cannon.92  The two boys later decided to cover 
82 Id. at 67–68 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75). 
83 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). As will be explained below, Miller held that even 
for homicide offenses, a court could not impose a mandatory life without parole 
sentence without considering certain mitigating factors. Id. 
84 Id. at 2460. 
85 Id. at 2461. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. The trial judge was statutorily required to sentence Jackson to life 
without the possibility of parole. Id. 
89 Id. at 2462. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
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up their crime and lit two fires to burn down the trailer.93  
Cannon died from the injuries he sustained from the baseball bat 
and from smoke inhalation.94  Miller was ultimately convicted of 
murder in the course of arson and was sentenced to a statutorily 
imposed mandatory minimum sentence of life without parole.95 
The Court, in discussing the issue of youth and culpability, 
stated broadly that “Roper and Graham establish that children 
are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing.”96  The Court then repeated the three differences 
between juvenile and adult offenders pointed out in Roper and 
concluded that these differences “diminish the penological 
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile 
offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.”97  The Court 
then took Graham one step further when it noted: 
To be sure, Graham’s flat ban on life without parole applied 
only to nonhomicide crimes, and the Court took care to 
distinguish those offenses from murder, based on both moral 
culpability and consequential harm.  But none of what it said 
about children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental 
traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.98 
Put another way, “the Court considered whether the rationale of 
Roper and Graham was limited by their factual settings and 
concluded it was not.”99 
However, the Court did not categorically ban life without 
parole sentences for all juvenile offenders, but rather 
categorically prohibited a mandatory imposition of life without 
parole if a court did not “take into account how children are 
different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably 
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”100  Finally, the Court 
predicted, that “given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and 
this decision about children’s diminished culpability and 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 2462–63. 
96 Id. at 2464. This statement seems to answer one question left open by 
Graham that, to a majority, “kids are different” See St. Vincent, supra note 39, at 9. 
97 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65. The three differences being that (1) juveniles 
lack maturity, (2) they succumb easily to peer pressure, and (3) they lack a well 
formed character. Id. at 2464. 
98 Id. at 2465 (citation omitted). 
99 State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 65 (Iowa 2013). 
100 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (noting that the Court is not considering the 
categorical bar argument). 
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heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions 
for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possibly penalty will be 
uncommon.”101 
What is unclear after the trilogy, specifically after Miller, is 
what was meant by the Court’s prediction that a sentence of life 
without parole will be “uncommon.”102  The Supreme Court did 
not categorically ban the sentence, but it certainly appears that 
was the direction in which it was heading.103  It is also unclear 
what is meant by Graham’s requirement that the state must 
provide “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”104  Finally, what was 
left unresolved and what this Note focuses on is the application 
of the trilogy to de facto life sentences.105 
C. Differing Judicial Philosophies 
Before addressing the split amongst the state and federal 
courts on the de facto life sentencing issue, it is necessary to 
briefly explore the theoretical underpinnings implicit in each 
side’s argument.  This section first explores judicial formalism 
and realism—or instrumentalism.  Next, this section explores 
judicial minimalism and maximalism.  Ultimately, this Note 
posits that the spirit approach rightly recognizes that the 
Supreme Court, in its trilogy on juvenile sentencing, clearly 
wanted an instrumentalist and maximalist interpretation 
applied to the issue of de facto life sentences. 
1. Formalism and Instrumentalism 
Formalism is the idea that law and precedent can be applied 
to new cases and facts like a “mathematical formula[].”106  In 
other words, “judges [do] not make law (even when declaring new 
rules) but merely discove[r] and appl[y] preexisting law.”107  
Professor Lawrence B. Solum, a prominent legal formalist, has 
101 Id. 
102 Null, 836 N.W.2d at 66. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 67–68 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010)). 
105 Id. at 67. 
106 Jeffrey M. Shaman, Essay: Constitutional Interpretation: Illusion and 
Reality, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 135–36 (1994) (quoting Gompers v. United States, 
233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914)). 
107 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING 13 (2010) (emphasis omitted). 
FINAL _JONES 8/25/2016  12:04 PM 
2016] SENTENCES FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS 183 
described two ideas that formalists believe:  First, that judges 
should follow the law and not make it; and second, that judges 
should decide cases in ways that are consistent with controlling 
precedent.108  For a formalist judge, stability and predictability in 
the law are important goals; therefore, judges should apply the 
existing precedent narrowly, rather than expansively.109 
An instrumentalist or realist generally believes that “legal 
rules should be interpreted in light of their purposes.”110  An 
instrumentalist, rather than applying a rule mechanically, will 
instead “[dig] beneath the semantic surface of the applicable rule 
for the practical considerations that motivated its adoption.”111  
When applying a precedent, the instrumentalist will ask whether 
the application furthers the precedent’s purpose.112  If not, then a 
judge should not apply the precedent; however, “if the spirit of 
the law would be served by its application, then [a] judge[] should 
give the rule an expansive interpretation.”113  Thus, an 
instrumentalist judge may be more willing than a classic 
formalist judge to expand a precedent or overturn a precedent if 
the court determines it was a wrong application of its purpose. 
A common critique of instrumentalism, which will be 
explained below, is that legal rules and precedent provide more 
predictability than do judges’ subjective beliefs on what a rule’s 
purpose is.114  In other words, legal rules provide certainty, 
whereas “[p]urposes provide less guidance, and different judges 
are likely to have different opinions about what the true purposes 
of the rule may be.”115  For a formalist, it is the rule itself that is 
important, not necessarily the broader purpose behind it. 
 
 
108 Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 043: Formalism and 
Instrumentalism, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON (May 22, 2005), 
http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/05/legal-theory-lexicon-043-formalism-
and.html. 
109 Id.; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 5 (2013) (arguing 
that formalists believe that “change in law” falls to legislative and executive 
branches, not the judicial branch). 
110 Id. 
111 See Posner, supra note 109, at 121. 
112 See Solum, supra note 108. 
113 Id. 
114 See Solum, supra note 108. 
115 Id. 
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Instrumentalism and realism are often defined by their 
opposition to formalism, indeed the whole theory generally arose 
as a critique of formalism.116  One of the main critiques of 
formalism is that a rigid application of “the rule”—or precedent—
can lead to absurd results.117  A classic example of the absurd 
result criticism is a medieval law—for the sake of this Note, let 
us say a precedent—that forbade drawing blood on the streets, 
but was applied to a doctor aiding a dying patient.118  Obviously 
the purpose of the law was to stop crime, not to stop a doctor 
from helping a dying patient.  Another common criticism is that 
formalist judges ultimately decide cases based upon their own 
policy preferences and “dress up the results in language of legal 
formalism.”119 
The contrasts between formalism and instrumentalism, as 
this Note explores in Parts II and III, are especially prevalent in 
the de facto life sentencing issue.  The letter of the law approach 
tends to overly formalize the Supreme Court trilogy, while the 
spirit approach rightly recognizes the trilogy’s overarching 
purpose. 
2. Minimalism and Maximalism 
Minimalism is the idea that a judge, in deciding a case, 
should say “no more than necessary to justify an outcome, and 
leav[e] as much as possible undecided.”120  The basic idea is that 
courts should refrain from deciding issues that are not necessary 
to the resolution of the case at hand.121  One appeal of 
minimalism is that it avoids “foundational issues,” which people 
tend to have deep disagreements about.122  Another appeal is that 
116 See Posner, supra note 109. 
117 Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 
IND. L. REV. 57, 69 (2003). 
118 Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 471 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
119 Solum, supra note 108. 
120 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 3 (1999). 
121 Id. at 4, 10. However, Professor Sunstein added the caveat that courts can 
decide other cases when “one decision necessarily bears on other cases.” Id. at 10. It 
is this Note’s position that it is an error for courts to interpret the trilogy as not 
applying to lengthy term-of-years that are the functional equivalent of a “life 
sentence” such as the 76.5 year sentence given to the sixteen-year-old defendant in 
State v. Henry. See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
122 See Sunstein, supra note 120, at 14. 
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this approach is based upon democratic ideals—the idea that 
each branch of government has its own role to play, and judges, 
as a general rule, should avoid broad decisions that might trump 
on other, more democratic, branches’ roles.123  Finally, another 
benefit of minimalism is that judges who employ this approach 
avoid opening up more questions than necessary to decide the 
assigned case.124 
The maximalist judge, by contrast, is one who “seek[s] to 
decide cases in a way that sets broad rules for the future and 
that also gives ambitious theoretical justifications for 
outcomes.”125  No judge could be absolutely maximalist because 
no judge “seeks to decide, in every case, everything that might be 
decided” in the future; however, maximalism is often employed 
when courts seek to decide broader, more ambitious issues often 
regarding constitutional notions of “liberty” and “equality.”126 
While no judge could be strictly a minimalist or a 
maximalist, some cases arguably do stand for a broader 
proposition.  This Note’s conclusion is that the Supreme Court 
trilogy is an example of a broader concern for juveniles and that 
the spirit approach on the de facto life sentence issue rightly 
recognizes what the Court was trying to accomplish. 
In Part II, this Note analyzes the current split on the de 
facto life sentence issue, and ultimately shows that the spirit 
approach rightly extends the trilogy to this issue. 
II. THE SPLIT: THE “SPIRIT” APPROACH VERSUS THE “LETTER OF 
THE LAW” APPROACH 
As mentioned above, a split has developed in state and 
federal courts regarding the United States Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in the juvenile sentencing trilogy and its application to 
de facto life sentences for juvenile offenders.127  This section 
explores the split and examines the competing reasoning used by 
each side. 
123 Id. at 24–25. 
124 Id. at 10. 
125 Id. at 9–10. 
126 Id. at 3, 9–11. 
127 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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A. The “Letter of the Law” Approach 
What this Note terms the “letter of the law” approach128 is 
when courts employ a formalistic and minimalistic construction 
of the Supreme Court trilogy.  The main argument of the letter of 
the law approach is that because none of the Supreme Court 
cases dealt specifically with de facto life sentences or lengthy 
term-of-year sentences, the reasoning of Roper, Graham, and 
Miller do not apply.129  Below are examples of two decisions that 
employed the letter of the law approach. 
1. Henry v. State130 
In 2012, the District Court of Appeal for Florida’s Fifth 
Appellate District considered Graham’s application to a ninety 
year prison sentence for a juvenile nonhomicide offender and 
ultimately concluded that it did not apply.131 
Seventeen year-old Leighdon Henry was charged and 
convicted of three counts of sexual battery, one count of 
kidnapping with intent to commit a felony, two counts of robbery, 
one count of carjacking, and one count of possession of 
marijuana.132  For all of these crimes, Henry was sentenced to 
ninety years in prison.133  Under Florida law, Henry will be 
required to serve at least eighty-five percent of his sentence, 
thus, he will serve at least 76.5 years before he is eligible for 
release.134  In other words, Henry will be 93.5 years old when he 
becomes eligible for parole.  Henry appealed his sentence arguing 
it constituted a de facto life sentence in violation of Graham.135 
128 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
129 Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 552–53 (6th Cir. 2012). 
130 82 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012), decision quashed, 175 So. 3d 675 
(Fla. 2015). It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Florida recently held that 
de facto life sentences for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment, thus quashing Henry v. State. See Gridine v. State, 175 So. 3d 672 (Fla. 
2015). However, the reasoning in Henry is still used by a number of “letter of the 
law” courts. See, e.g., Smith, 685 F.3d at 552; State v. Brown, 2012-0872, p. 10 (La. 
5/7/13); 118 So. 3d 332, 338–39; Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 781 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 
2016). 
131 Henry, 82 So. 3d at 1089. 
132 Id. at 1085. One night, Henry broke into the victim’s apartment, threatened 
her with a gun, and brutally raped her. Id. He then stole from the victim and forced 
her to drive him to an ATM and made her withdraw money. Id. The victim luckily 
was able to escape after they left the ATM. Id. 
133 Id. at 1086. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
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The Henry court ultimately concluded that Graham was 
inapplicable to the defendant’s sentence because Graham only 
dealt with “life without parole” and not lengthy term-of-years 
sentences.136  The court began by discussing Graham and 
favorably cited Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, specifically:  
“[N]othing in the Court’s opinion affects the imposition of a 
sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole.”137  
The Henry court then distinguished Graham by noting that “[t]he 
facts here are different from those in Graham.  Here, unlike the 
defendant in Graham, Henry did not (in the end) receive a life 
sentence without parole for a nonhomicide offense; he received a 
lengthy aggregate term-of-years sentence without the possibility 
of parole for multiple nonhomicide offenses.”138  This was the 
pivotal move of the court and is evidence of a very formalistic and 
minimalistic view of Graham.  Put another way, by noting the 
technical differences from Graham,139 the Henry court was able to 
conclude its reasoning did not apply. 
The Henry court then went on to discuss the vast difficulties 
of applying Graham to de facto life sentences: 
At what number of years would the Eighth Amendment become 
implicated in the sentencing of a juvenile: twenty, thirty, forty, 
fifty, some lesser or greater number?  Would gain time be taken 
into account?  Could the number vary from offender to offender 
based on race, gender, socioeconomic class or other criteria?  
Does the number of crimes matter? . . . Without any tools to 
work with, however, we can only apply Graham as it is written.  
If the Supreme Court has more in mind, it will have to say what 
that is.140 
 
 
 
136 Id. at 1089. 
137 Id. at 1087 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 124 (2010) (Alito, J., 
dissenting)). 
138 Id. at 1087. 
139 Although the Henry court was correct in noting the differences, it is the 
conclusion of this Note that there were far more similarities. The crimes in Henry 
were much more gruesome, but they were, like Graham, nonhomicide offenses thus 
triggering Graham’s application. Also, it is this Notes opinion that not affording a 
juvenile offender an opportunity for release until they are 93.5 years old triggers the 
very concerns the Supreme Court raised when discussing the sentencing practices in 
Miller and Graham. 
140 Henry, 82 So. 3d at 1089. 
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Thus, although conceding there was language in Graham that 
hints at its applicability to de facto life sentences,141 the Henry 
court reached its ultimate conclusion by exploiting the technical 
differences between the facts before it and Graham. 
2. Bunch v. Smith 
Six months after Henry, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit held that an eighty-nine year sentence given 
to a sixteen-year-old, nonhomicide offender did “not violate 
clearly established federal law.”142 
When Chaz Bunch was sixteen years old, he was charged 
and convicted of robbing, kidnapping, and raping a young 
woman.143  Due to his numerous convictions, Bunch was 
consecutively sentenced to a total of eighty-nine years, ensuring 
he would not be released until he was 105 years old.144  Bunch 
appealed, arguing that Graham should be extended to de facto 
life sentences.145 
The Sixth Circuit held that neither Graham nor Miller 
applied to this case because neither of the two cases 
“establish[ed] that consecutive, fixed-term sentences for juveniles 
who have committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are 
unconstitutional when they amount to the practical equivalent of 
life without parole.”146 
The Sixth Circuit discussed the Court’s holding in Graham, 
and distinguished the facts of the two cases using formalist and 
minimalist reasoning.147  The Sixth Circuit noted that Graham 
“did not address juvenile offenders, like Bunch, who received 
consecutive, fixed-term sentences for committing multiple 
141 Id. 
142 Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 2012). 
143 Id. at 547. In 2001, Bunch and two accomplices stopped the victim at her 
place of work. Id. at 547–48. After forcing her to get in their car at gunpoint, Bunch 
and an accomplice took turns raping the victim as the third accomplice robbed the 
victim’s car. Id. at 548. Eventually the third accomplice stopped the rape, and all 
three were later apprehended. Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 547. 
147 Id. at 550–51. The Sixth Circuit, like the Henry court, pointed out the 
technical differences of Graham, when discussing its ruling, for example, by noting 
multiple times that Graham only applied to life without parole for nonhomicide 
sentences. Id. at 551. 
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nonhomicide offenses.”148  The court conceded that Bunch’s 
sentence may very well equate to the “functional equivalent” of 
life without parole but “since no federal court has ever extended 
Graham’s holding beyond its plain language,” they could not hold 
that his sentence was unconstitutional.149  Like the Henry court, 
this rationale made it abundantly clear that the Sixth Circuit 
was reading the trilogy in a very formalistic and minimalistic 
way. 
The Sixth Circuit then argued that the split amongst the 
states regarding de facto life sentences demonstrated that the 
broader reading of Graham was not “clearly established.”150  The 
court explicitly adopted the Henry court’s minimalist reasoning 
and concluded that “[i]f the Supreme Court has more in mind, it 
will have to say what that is.”151 
Finally, the Sixth Circuit also concluded that the Court’s 
decision in Miller did not apply to the facts before it.152  The Sixth 
Circuit rejected Miller’s application because Miller “did not 
address juvenile offenders, like Bunch, who received consecutive, 
fixed-term sentences for committing nonhomicide offenses.”153  
Bunch appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, but in 2013, 
the Court denied his petition for certiorari.154 
As was the case in Henry, the Sixth Circuit in Bunch 
capitalized on the technical factual differences between Graham 
and its case.  However, the Sixth Circuit took Henry one step 
further by extending the letter of the law approach to Miller. 
3. Conclusion on the “Letter of the Law” Approach 
These cases establish the blueprint for a court to hold that 
Miller and Graham are inapplicable to de facto life sentences.  
The first step is to point out how narrow those two holdings 
are,155 while ignoring the broader propositions they arguably 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 552. 
151 Id. at 553 (alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 
1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Bunch v. Bobby, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013). 
155 See, e.g., Bunch, 685 F.3d at 547 (arguing that Graham did “not clearly 
establish that consecutive, fixed-term sentences for juveniles who have committed 
multiple nonhomicide offenses are unconstitutional when they amount to the 
practical equivalent of life without parole”); Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1087 
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stand for.  The courts employ a formalistic and minimalistic view 
of the trilogy by pointing out that nothing in Miller or Graham 
applies to lengthy term-of-years sentences.  The second step is to 
cite favorably Justice Alito’s dissent in Graham.156  Finally, the 
courts point out that if Miller or Graham were to be extended to 
de facto life sentences, there would be tremendous difficulty in 
establishing a bright line.157 
B. The “Spirit” Approach 
Courts that employ this approach recognize that “[t]he spirit 
of the constitutional mandates of Miller and Graham instruct 
that much more is at stake in the sentencing of juveniles than 
merely making sure parole is possible.”158  This approach 
dismisses the technical distinctions between life without parole 
and a de facto life sentence by endorsing the broader reasoning 
underlying the Supreme Court trilogy.  Courts that endorse the 
spirit approach employ an instrumentalist and maximalist 
reading of the juvenile sentencing trilogy. 
1. State v. Ragland 
As discussed previously, Ragland dealt with a unique set of 
facts and procedural posture.159  In 1986, when Jeffrey Ragland 
was seventeen years old, he and two friends attacked another 
group of boys in a grocery store parking lot.160  Moments before 
the fight, Ragland yelled either “[l]et’s do it” or “[w]e’re gonna 
fight.”161  Moments after Ragland yelled, one of his accomplices 
struck the victim in the head with a tire iron, killing him.162  
Ragland was charged and convicted of first-degree murder based 
on the theory he was the instigator of the crime, despite the fact 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (arguing that unlike Graham, which dealt with a life 
sentence without parole, the defendant in this case was sentenced to a lengthy term-
of-years sentence without the possibility of parole), decision quashed, 175 So. 3d 675 
(Fla. 2015). 
156 See supra notes 138 and 149 and accompanying text. 
157 Bunch, 685 F.3d at 552 (arguing that extending Graham’s meaning to de 
facto life sentences “would lead to a lot of questions”); see also Henry, 82 So. 3d at 
1089. 
158 State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 121 (Iowa 2013). 
159 See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text. 
160 Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 110. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
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that he did not actually swing the tire iron.163  Ragland was 
sentenced to the mandatory sentence of life without parole.164  
Matt Gill, who actually swung the tire iron, was charged with 
second-degree murder and served three years in prison.165 
In 2012, after Graham, but before Miller, the Governor of 
Iowa commuted Ragland and thirty-seven other Graham 
challengers’ sentences to life with no possibility of parole for sixty 
years imprisonment with no credit given for earned time.166  
Ragland challenged this sentence as being a violation of the 
Court’s recent decision in Miller.167 
The Supreme Court of Iowa ultimately concluded that Miller 
and Graham applied to de facto life sentences and as such, 
Ragland’s sentence was unconstitutional.168  Specifically, the 
Ragland court held that “[f]or all practical purposes, the same 
motivation behind the mandates of Miller applies to the 
commuted sentence in this case or any sentence that is the 
practical equivalent to life without parole.”169 
The Ragland court, in a rebuttal to the letter of the law 
argument, then stated that “[o]ftentimes, it is important that the 
spirit of the law not be lost in the application of the law.  This is 
one such time.”170  This is an implicit adoption of an 
instrumentalist or maximalist reading of the trilogy, illustrated 
by its broad declaration: 
In the end, a government system that resolves disputes could 
hardly call itself a system of justice with a rule that demands 
individualized sentencing considerations common to all youths 
apply only to those youths facing a sentence of life without 
parole and not to those youths facing a sentence of life with no  
 
 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 112. Gill wrote a letter in support of Ragland’s release where he 
claimed sole responsibility for the death and disputed the State’s argument that 
Ragland was the “Ring Leader.” Id. 
166 Id. at 111. The effect of this commutation would mean that Ragland would 
not be eligible for parole until he was seventy-eight years old. Id. at 119. 
167 Id. at 112. 
168 Id. at 121. 
169 Id. The Ragland court noted that Miller and Graham held that to sentence a 
juvenile to life without parole foreswears any possibility of rehabilitation and rejects 
the fact that juveniles have a lesser culpability and greater ability to change. Id. 
170 Id. 
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parole until age seventy-eight.  Accordingly, we hold Miller 
applies to sentences that are the functional equivalent of life 
without parole.171 
The Ragland court affirmed the sentence imposed by the 
district court, thus making the defendant immediately eligible for 
parole.172  However, the Supreme Court of Iowa was not done on 
the de facto life sentence issue.  On the very same day, it decided 
State v. Null, another decision that accepted that the Supreme 
Court’s spirit approach extended to de facto life sentences. 
2. State v. Null 
In State v. Null, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the 
trial court’s sentence of a minimum of 52.5 years for a sixteen-
year-old juvenile offender was unconstitutional, in violation of 
Roper, Graham, and Miller.173 
The case involved Denem Anthony Null who was charged 
and convicted of second-degree murder and first-degree 
robbery.174  Null challenged the conviction on numerous grounds, 
the main one being that his sentence was in violation of the 
Supreme Court’s holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller.175 
The Supreme Court of Iowa began by pointing out that the 
Supreme Court trilogy actually stood for the proposition that 
juveniles are generally less culpable and less deserving of the 
harshest sentences than are their adult counterparts.176  First, 
the court noted that Miller emphasized that nothing said in the 
Supreme Court trilogy is “crime-specific.”177  Thus, central to the 
Court’s holding in the three cases is the notion that “children are 
different” and are categorically less culpable then adults.178 
 
 
171 Id. at 121–22. 
172 Id. at 122. 
173 836 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Iowa 2013). 
174 Id. In 2006, Null and two accomplices went to the victim’s home to steal a 
pound of marijuana and in the course of the robbery Null shot and killed the victim. 
Id. at 45–46. 
175 Id. at 50. Null argued that his sentence was a de facto life sentence while the 
State urged for strict construction of the Supreme Court trilogy, noting that Graham 
and Miller only dealt with life without parole sentences. Id. at 50–51. 
176 Id. at 71. 
177 Id. at 67 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012)). 
178 Id. at 71. 
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Second, the court conceded that the 52.5 year sentence here 
was “not technically life-without-parole,” however, it was still 
“sufficient to trigger Miller-type protections.”179  The court 
dismissed the letter of the law approach as “seek[ing] to avoid the 
basic thrust of Roper, Graham, and Miller by refusing to 
recognize the underlying rational of the Supreme Court is not 
crime specific.”180  The Supreme Court of Iowa concluded: 
Miller’s principles are fully applicable to a lengthy term-of-years 
sentence as was imposed in this case because an offender 
sentenced to a lengthy term-of-years sentence should not be 
worse off than an offender sentenced to life in prison without 
parole who has the benefit of an individualized hearing under 
Miller.181 
3. Conclusion on the “Spirit” Approach 
For a court to extend the Supreme Court’s spirit approach to 
de facto life sentences for juvenile offenders, a common path has 
emerged.  First, the term-of-years sentence must clearly outlast 
the offender’s life span or come very close to it.182  Second, this 
approach recognizes that the broader and maximalist tenets of 
the Supreme Court trilogy was that “children are different” and 
therefore, less culpable, and while the state does not have to one-
day release juvenile offenders, they are entitled to a meaningful 
opportunity for release.183  Under this prong, the spirit courts 
rightly employ the maximalist and instrumentalist approach to 
juvenile sentencing that the Supreme Court clearly intended.  
Finally, this approach flatly rejects the formalist and minimalist 
strategy regarding the sentence’s label, and is willing to apply 
the tenets of the trilogy to almost all categories of juvenile 
offenders.184 
179 Id. The Null court stated these “protections” were some sort of opportunity to 
obtain release by showing “maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. 
180 Id. at 72–73. 
181 Id. at 72. 
182 For example, in State v. Null, the juvenile offender would not be eligible for 
parole until he was sixty-nine years old. Id. at 45. 
183 Id. at 71 (noting that “the notion[] in Roper, Graham, and Miller [is] that 
‘children are different’ and that they are categorically less culpable than adult 
offenders”). 
184 Id. at 72, 75. For example, the Null court argued that, in effect, the letter of 
the law approach is basically stating that a juvenile sentenced to a lengthy term-of-
years sentence should be worse off than a juvenile sentenced to life without parole. 
Id. at 72. 
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III. COURTS AND LEGISLATURES MUST APPLY THE SUPREME 
COURT “SPIRIT” APPROACH TO DE FACTO LIFE SENTENCES 
After the United States Supreme Court trilogy, state and 
federal courts have struggled to apply the resulting mandates to 
de facto life sentences.  The approaches employed by the 
Supreme Court of Iowa and other courts is the better reading of 
the trilogy because these courts recognize the broader and 
maximalist tenets that those decisions stood for.  This Part 
argues that as long as the Supreme Court stays out of the de 
facto life sentence issue, state courts must extend the reasoning 
of the trilogy to de facto sentences. 
A. The “Spirit” Approach Is the Better Analysis for De Facto Life 
Sentences 
Say, for example, in 2005, two juvenile offenders—X and Y, 
both sixteen years old—commit armed burglary.  The lowest 
sentence they may receive is five years in prison and the 
maximum is life without parole.  X is sentenced to life without 
parole and Y is sentenced to seventy years.  In other words, Y 
will not be eligible for parole until he is eighty-six years old.  
Today, both are seeking resentencing based on the Supreme 
Court trilogy.  Every court, even the ones that apply the trilogy 
narrowly, would agree that X would have to be given some 
meaningful opportunity for release because of the label of his 
sentence: “life without parole.”185  However, depending on the 
state Y is in, he may not be given a meaningful opportunity for 
release, unless he is lucky enough to live to be eighty-six years 
old.  Despite the fact that X and Y committed the same crimes, 
and despite the fact that X was sentenced to the “second most 
severe penalty permitted by law,”186 X will likely receive a chance 
at redemption while Y will most likely die in jail. 
This, of course, is the hypocrisy of the current split on the de 
facto life sentences issue.  Because of the label “life without 
parole,” X will receive at least the possibility of parole, while Y, 
serving the functional equivalent of life without parole, will not. 
185 See State v. Brown, 2012-0872, p. 14 (La. 5/7/13); 118 So. 3d 332, 341 
(recognizing that the defendant’s life sentence would qualify for Graham protections, 
but the problem was that the defendant committed four other nonhomicide crimes). 
186 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 
501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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1. The Broader Concern for Juvenile Offenders 
The Supreme Court trilogy represents a broader concern for 
the culpability of juveniles and accepts “the notion that juveniles 
are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of the 
imposition of harsh punishments.”187  Indeed, if the trilogy stands 
for anything it is that juveniles, as compared to adults, “are 
developmentally immature, are less culpable . . . and more likely 
to reform—and that these differences are important to the legal 
response to juvenile crime.”188  Also, as the Court discussed in 
Graham and Miller, the traditional justifications for the harshest 
penalties do not apply to juvenile offenders in the same way they 
would an adult offender.189  As Graham made clear, juveniles 
sentenced to life without parole are deprived of hope, are given 
little incentive to rehabilitate, and are categorically barred from 
any chance to prove to society that they have learned from their 
mistakes.190  Therefore, the trilogy are maximalist decisions 
meant to apply to juvenile sentencing generally191 and are not to 
be ignored merely because of the label of the sentence. 
None of these broad concerns are alleviated simply because 
the juvenile is sentenced to a de facto life sentence.  A juvenile 
sentenced to seventy years without the possibility of parole is no 
less deserving of a chance to show redemption then a juvenile 
sentenced to life without parole. 
A broader and maximalist reading of the Supreme Court 
trilogy recognizes what the Court was trying to accomplish.192  
Common sense dictates that concerns about juveniles sentenced 
to harsh penalties do not disappear simply because it is a lengthy 
term-of-years sentence, rather than life without parole.  The 
concerns that the Court noted in the trilogy apply equally to 
juveniles sentenced to lengthy-term-of years.  It would be absurd 
to say that juveniles sentenced to de facto life sentences are more  
 
187 Null, 836 N.W.2d at 66. 
188 Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile 
Crime Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535, 535 (2013). 
189 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012). 
190 Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–70. 
191 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
192 See, e.g., Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74 (“[T]he direction from the Supreme Court 
that trial courts consider everything said about youth in Roper, Graham, and Miller 
means more than a generalized notion of taking age into consideration as a factor in 
sentencing.”). 
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mature, more culpable, and less likely to reform because of the 
label of their sentence.193  The spirit approach thus rightly 
comports with the trilogy’s concern regarding juvenile offenders. 
2. The Incorrect “Super-Predator” Fear 
When discussing the de facto life sentencing issue, it is 
impossible not to recognize that the rapid rise in harsh sentences 
for juveniles is a modern phenomenon.  The changes in state 
juvenile sentencing practices were shaped by the mythical fear 
that juvenile “super-predators” were on the rise and had to be 
severely punished.194 
However, as several commentators have noted, this fear was 
a fiction and juvenile crime has sharply decreased in recent 
years.195  Before the super-predator fear swept America, juveniles 
rarely received life without parole.196  However, after the 
introduction of this fear, juveniles were sentenced to life without 
parole “three times as frequently as they were in 1990.”197 
The Court attempted to peel back this recent phenomenon.  
In applying the trilogy to de facto life sentencing cases, courts 
that use the spirit approach are correctly employing 
instrumentalism in that they are “digging beneath” the Court’s 
reasoning and recognizing the “practical considerations that 
motivated” its rulings.198  Thus, courts that follow the spirit 
approach recognize that the Court was particularly troubled by 
the history of juvenile sentencing in this country, and correctly 
expand the trilogy’s application to sentences that are the 
functional equivalent of life without parole. 
B. The “Letter of the Law” Courts Ignore Broader Concerns 
Based on Technical Differences 
Courts that employ a “letter of the law” approach wrongly 
ignore what the Supreme Court was trying to accomplish in the 
trilogy on juvenile sentencing.  By employing an extremely 
193 Id. at 72 (arguing that a juvenile sentenced to a de facto life sentence should 
not be worse off than a juvenile sentenced to a life sentence.). 
194 See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra notes 32, 36 and accompanying text; see also Wallace, supra note 
40, at 41 (noting that “[r]emarkably, this super-predator myth arrived on the scene 
during a decrease in juvenile crime”). 
196 See Wallace, supra note 40, at 42–43. 
197 Id. at 43. 
198 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
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formalistic and minimalist reading of the trilogy, courts seem to 
intentionally throw away what the trilogy actually stood for.  
Despite the benefits of formalism and minimalism in other 
contexts, it is abundantly clear that the trilogy stood for a 
broader concern of juvenile sentencing.  Thus, the courts that use 
this approach wrongfully ignore common sense and exploit the 
labels of sentences to get around the broader maximalist and 
instrumentalist holdings of the trilogy. 
1. Ignoring Common Sense 
A common theme among the courts that apply the trilogy 
narrowly is that because the Supreme Court only dealt with “life 
without parole” sentences, lengthy term-of-years sentences are 
outside the scope of its holdings.  While no one can dispute the 
scope, the Court did not decide the constitutionality of de facto 
life sentences.199  To throw away the Court’s broader concerns for 
juveniles based on labels ignores what the three decisions were 
trying to accomplish. 
All of the “letter of the law” cases analyzed by this Note 
emphasize that Graham and Miller only dealt with life without 
parole sentences.200  For these courts, the lengthy term-of-years 
sentences made Graham and Miller inapplicable.201  However, it 
does not take a sociologist to recognize that if a juvenile does not 
have a chance for parole until they are 93.5 years old or 78 years 
old, the juvenile will most likely die before getting that 
opportunity.202  In fact, without taking race, gender, economic 
status or the earlier mortality rate of those incarcerated into 
effect,203 the average age of death in this country is 78.8 years.204  
While not life without parole, it is certainly the functional 
equivalent of it.  If the sentence is the functional equivalent of 
life without parole, then all of the broader concerns about 
juvenile sentencing espoused in the trilogy should apply. 
199 State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 67 (Iowa 2013) (“Neither Roper, Graham, nor 
Miller involved a sentence for a lengthy term of years that was not life without 
parole.”). 
200 See supra Part II.A. 
201 See supra Part II.A. 
202 See supra notes 134 and 144 and accompanying text. 
203 Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012), decision 
quashed, 175 So. 3d 675 (Fla. 2015). 
204 Deaths and Mortality, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/deaths.htm (last updated Feb. 25, 2016). 
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2. Errant Application of Formalism and Minimalism to the 
Trilogy 
The basic problem with the letter of the law view is that it 
wrongfully applies minimalism and formalism to the Supreme 
Court’s trilogy cases.  The letter of the law courts use 
exaggerated technical differences to ignore the basic principles 
the Supreme Court has deemed relevant for juvenile sentencing. 
First, the Court made clear that states are forbidden “from 
making the judgment at the outset that [juvenile] offenders never 
will be fit to reenter society.”205  Second, the Court held that, 
while eventual release is not guaranteed, the States are required 
to give juvenile offenders a “meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”206  
Third, Miller stated that none of the concerns expressed about 
sentencing juveniles is “crime-specific” and that “Graham’s 
reasoning implicates any life-without-parole sentence imposed on 
a juvenile, even as its categorical bar relates only to nonhomicide 
offenses.”207  Finally, while Miller does allow life without parole 
to be imposed—after individualized characteristics of youth are 
considered—the Court predicted that the “harshest possible 
penalty will be uncommon.”208 
If the Court made clear that States must give juveniles some 
chance at redemption, then concerns about juveniles’ diminished 
culpability are not “crime-specific,” and that life without parole 
will become “uncommon” for all classes of juvenile offenders, such 
tenets should not be any less applicable to the functional 
equivalent of life without parole.  Is it really, as the Sixth Circuit 
argued, because the sentence of “life” was not involved?209  This is 
an extremely formalistic reading of the Supreme Court trilogy, 
and one that the Court certainly did not intend.  The Court’s 
broader intention in the trilogy was to make clear that juveniles 
were constitutionally different for sentencing purposes.210  The 
Court intentionally used broad language to note the differences 
between juveniles and adults as well as hint that, as a general 
205 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). 
206 Id. 
207 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012). 
208 Id. at 2469. 
209 Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir. 2012). 
210 State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 65 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 
2464 (2012)). 
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matter, juveniles should not be handed the harshest penalties 
afforded by law.211  It appears as though the Court used 
instrumentalist and maximalist reasoning to, in part, deal with 
the relatively recent rise of harsh sentences for juvenile 
offenders.212 
Letter of the law courts clearly disagree and use minimalism 
and formalism to “dress up” their disagreements.213  However, 
after three broad opinions, lower courts should not misconstrue 
what the trilogy stood for simply because of the label of the 
sentence or their personal disagreement with a higher court. 
As the Null court argued, a juvenile sentenced to a lengthy 
term-of-years should not be worse off than a juvenile sentenced 
to life.214  It would be inconsistent to require a meaningful 
opportunity for a release in a life sentence, but subsequently 
deny that chance in a ninety year sentence.  This approach 
incorrectly ignores the broader principles of the trilogy. 
C. State Courts Must Apply the “Spirit” Approach When 
Legislatures Fail To Act 
The Supreme Court has, to date, denied certiorari in de facto 
life sentence cases.215  If the Court continues to deny certiorari for 
cases involving de facto life sentences, state courts must apply 
the spirit approach to juveniles sentenced to de facto life 
sentences, especially where there has been insufficient or no 
legislative response to the Court’s recent decisions.  As long as 
state legislatures continue to stall, state courts are in a unique 
position to deal with the de facto life sentence issue with 
common-sense procedures and rules. 
 
 
 
 
 
211 See supra notes 97–100, 102 and accompanying text. 
212 See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
213 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
214 Null, 836 N.W.2d at 72. 
215 Bunch v. Bobby, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013); see also supra note 21 and 
accompanying text. 
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1. State Legislative Response Has Not Been Adequate 
Many commentators have argued that it is the legislature, 
and not the judiciary, that must enact laws that comport with the 
Supreme Court trilogy.216  Thus, some have argued that the state 
legislatures, and not the courts, should deal with the de facto life 
sentence issue.217  There are two problems with this argument. 
First, many states have not passed legislation comporting 
with the Court’s ruling in Miller.218  In fact, as of 2013, only 11 
states have passed laws in compliance with Miller.219  In 
addition, two of the five states that have held the majority of 
juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole have not 
passed legislation in compliance with Graham, let alone Miller.220  
If state legislatures are resisting the Court’s rulings on this 
issue, it is unlikely for them to take the lead with de facto life 
sentences. 
Second, even in states that have passed legislation, some 
state courts are constructing the statutes narrowly.221  For 
example, Louisiana passed a law in response to Graham that 
required, upon certain conditions, juvenile nonhomicide offenders 
previously sentenced to life without parole be eligible for a parole 
hearing after serving thirty years.222  However, the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana noted that the statute only applies to “life 
sentences” and therefore did not address lengthy term-of-years 
sentences.223 
If legislatures are resisting Graham and Miller legislation, 
such precedent cannot be relied upon to address de facto life 
sentences in the way the Court required. 
216 See, e.g., Drinan, supra note 17, at 786; Kelly Scavone, Note, How Long Is 
Too Long?: Conflicting State Responses to De Facto Life Without Parole Sentences 
After Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3439, 3479 
(2014). 
217 See Scavone, supra note 216, at 3444. 
218 See Drinan, supra note 17, at 786–87. 
219 Id. at 787. 
220 Id. 
221 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 2012-0872 pp. 14–15 (La. 5/7/13); 118 So. 3d 332, 
341; see also supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
222 See Scavone, supra note 216, at 3471. 
223 Brown, 118 So. 3d. at 341. 
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2. Judicial Response Required 
If legislatures continue to stall, the highest state courts and 
federal appellate courts should continue to extend Graham and 
Miller to de facto life sentences.  In the absence of legislation, 
state courts should use State v. Null as a model when juveniles 
are sentenced to de facto life sentences.224 
The Supreme Court of Iowa emphasized a formula for trial 
courts to use when addressing de facto sentences, an approach 
that adequately deals with all of the concerns noted in the letter 
of the law approach.225  First, as a general rule, trial courts must 
recognize that “children are constitutionally different from 
adults.”226  Therefore, trial courts must recognize that the 
characteristics of youth are mitigating factors, not aggravating 
ones.227  If the trial court feels differently—for example, if the 
crimes are especially heinous—it must explain why the case 
warrants an exception from the general rule.228  In doing so, the 
court cannot just recite the facts of the crime, but instead must 
specifically explain why the mitigating factors do not apply.229  
Nothing in Roper, Graham or Miller ensures a juvenile offender 
will be released; however, what is required is that all juveniles, 
despite their crimes, be given some opportunity to show 
“rehabilitation and fitness to return to society.”230 
Second, trial courts should recognize that one of the central 
tenets of the Supreme Court trilogy is that “[j]uveniles are more 
capable of change than are adults,” and that courts should 
embrace the concept that most juveniles who commit criminal 
acts will not become lifelong criminals.231 
Third, trial courts should recognize that a lengthy term-of-
years sentence is only appropriate in “rare” cases.232  It may be 
that a “rare” case will be a particularly heinous crime like the 
ones in Henry and Bunch.  However, the sentencing court cannot 
make a definitive determination that the juvenile will never be 
able to rehabilitate. 
224 836 N.W.2d 41, 74–77 (Iowa 2013). 
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 74 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012)). 
227 Id. at 75. 
228 Id. at 74. 
229 Id. at 74–75. 
230 Id. at 75. 
231 Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)). 
232 Id. 
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Finally, although the Supreme Court of Iowa did not 
determine whether the 52.5 year sentence in Null constituted a 
de facto life sentence,233 this Note concludes that absent 
legislative determination, courts should use a common sense 
approach in determining what number or length of years 
constitutes a de facto life sentence. 
The letter of the law proponents would likely attack this 
formula as creating more confusion than existed before.  They 
will ask how many years will a juvenile have to serve before 
being given a “meaningful opportunity for release”?234  Would a 
forty year sentence trigger this sort of protection?  Does it make a 
difference whether the juvenile committed homicide or 
nonhomicide offenses?235  What if the juvenile committed 
multiple crimes?236 
The Supreme Court expressly and implicitly answered the 
latter two questions.237  Certainly, the first two questions are not 
easy to answer.  In judicially created law, it is difficult to make 
bright line determinations because it is impossible to foresee 
every future case.238  However, a few points might ease the 
concern of the letter of the law courts. 
First, nothing in the Supreme Court trilogy required that a 
juvenile offender be released.239  All that is required is that 
States do not categorically refuse juveniles a chance to show 
society that they have changed.240  Therefore, in a particularly 
gruesome case like Bunch v. Smith, where the defendant 
repeatedly raped, robbed, and abused a young woman,241 it might 
well be that the defendant will spend the rest of his or her life in  
 
233 Id. at 71. 
234 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
235 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
236 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
237 See Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71, 73 (recognizing that one of the central tenets of 
the trilogy is that the decisions were not “crime specific” and that one of the cases in 
Miller involved multiple crimes). 
238 See Sunstein, supra note 120, at 9. 
239 Null, 836 N.W.2d at 75 (“[N]othing in Roper, Graham, or Miller guarantees 
that youthful offenders will obtain eventual release.”). 
240 Id. (“All that is required is a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to demonstrate 
rehabilitation and fitness to return to society.” (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48, 75 (2010))). 
241 685 F.3d 546, 547–48 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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jail.  Nothing in the Court’s holdings would prevent that result.242  
All that is required is that the defendant is afforded a chance to 
prove he or she is reformed. 
Second, in the absence of state legislature action, courts 
should instead take a case-by-case approach to determine the 
amount of time required to be served before the “meaningful 
opportunity” be afforded.243  For example, it is clear that an 
eighty-nine year sentence244 would trigger Graham and Miller 
protections, while a 52.5 year sentence is a closer call.245 
In the absence of legislation, courts have a duty to extend the 
central tenets of Roper, Graham, and Miller’s reasoning to de 
facto life sentences for juvenile offenders. 
D. Proposed Model for State Action 
There are many issues with what state legislatures are 
enacting in response to Graham and Miller.246  Although this 
Note argues that state courts have a duty to extend the Supreme 
Court trilogy to de facto sentences, the far better response would 
be for States to enact legislation that clearly defines the limit for 
de facto sentences, clearly defines when Graham and Miller 
protections kick-in, and allows for judicial determination on what 
individualized mitigating factors are to be considered.  This 
would better deal with the issue of de facto life sentences and 
embrace the broader spirit of the Court’s decisions. 
1. Legislative Action 
States should enact legislation that deals with all of the 
outstanding issues of the post-Graham and Miller landscape.  
First, states should clearly define what length of sentence 
qualifies a juvenile offender for Graham and Miller protections.  
A number conceded by Graham’s counsel was forty years.247  
Although some states may want to go lower, it seems that a forty 
year sentence or more is of such length that it would adequately 
242 See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text. 
243 The ideal solution would be for the state legislatures to define the amount of 
time required to be served before the “meaningful opportunity” be afforded, or better 
yet, to create a bright-line rule dealing with the terms-of-years sentences. 
244 Bunch, 685 F.3d at 547. 
245 Null, 836 N.W.2d at 45. 
246 See supra notes 220–225. 
247 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 124 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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trigger Graham and Miller’s protections.  Second, states should 
create a schedule listing specific offenses—homicide, 
nonhomicide, and so forth—and mandate how long the offenders 
would have to serve before being given an opportunity to prove 
their redemption.  For example, if a juvenile in State X is 
convicted of homicide and is sentenced to a sixty year sentence, 
the schedule would require that after the juvenile serves thirty 
years, a parole board or court would be required to take a “second 
look” to determine if he has proven that he is rehabilitated and 
mature enough to be released.  The schedule can take into 
account aggregating offenses or particularly heinous 
nonhomicide offenses.  However, no matter how long the 
sentence is, after forty years, or whatever number the State 
chooses, a court or parole board is required to take a “second 
look.”  Third, legislatures should require that the juvenile 
offender affirmatively prove his or her rehabilitation and 
maturity by balancing certain factors.  Some factors proposed by 
commentators are education, the capacity to contribute to society, 
and counseling.248  Also, if the juvenile offender has disciplinary 
citations while incarcerated, he or she may sacrifice their 
opportunity for a “second look” depending on the nature of such 
offenses.  Finally, States should require judges to consider 
certain factors before sentencing, such as the ones presented by 
the Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. Null.249 
2. Judicial Action 
Under the model act, the state legislature should create a 
presumption against sentencing a juvenile to an extremely 
lengthy term in order to comply with Miller’s statement that the 
harshest sentences, while allowable, should be “uncommon.”250  
The act should require that mitigating factors of youth be 
considered at sentencing.  And, unlike Louisiana’s post-Miller 
law, the opportunity to affirmatively prove eligibility for release 
should be required after sentencing.251  This would mitigate the 
fact that “sentencing courts are likely not well equipped to make 
decisions about a juvenile’s potential for reform at this early 
248 See Drinan, supra note 17, at 793. 
249 See supra notes 227–235 and accompanying text. 
250 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
251 See Scavone, supra note 216, at 3471. 
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stage.”252  Finally, state courts should be allowed to review any 
parole board’s action to ensure compliance with the spirit of 
Graham and Miller.  This would ensure that parole boards are 
not simply rubber-stamping denials. 
CONCLUSION 
Roper, Graham, and Miller have opened up as many 
questions as they answered.  However, the broader implications 
of the Supreme Court trilogy on juvenile sentencing are clear.  
Some “meaningful opportunity for release”253 must be given to all 
juvenile offenders, regardless if they were sentenced to a lengthy-
term-of-years or life without parole.  Therefore, the split should 
be resolved in favor of the broader reading of the trilogy.  The 
broader reading acknowledges what common sense dictates:  
There is no functional difference between an eighty-nine year 
sentence and a sentence of life without parole.  Courts should 
ignore letter of the law arguments and recognize the Supreme 
Court trilogy for what it actually stands for. 
252 Id. 
253 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). 
